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uniquely valuable telecommunications assets, the prohibitions also amount to a regulatory taking.
But whether viewed as a Loretto taking or a regulatory taking, the regulations
proposed by the Commission in the NPRM would trigger a very large financial liability for the (rl,vernment to pay just compensation to building owners. This liability was certainly not foreseen or-intended by CODgress when it passed the Commumcations Act, nor was there any indication at all in the act that Congress meant
for the Commission to have the authority to issue regulations restricting the established rights of real property owners.
For these reaSODS, the Real Access Alliance has submitted comments to the Commission stating that the proposals discussed in its NPRM cause a taking of property
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee on this important subject.

Professor Dinh.
STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Mr. DINH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Conyers,
members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, and to Mr. Rosenthal for providing a very
thoughtful analysis and framing the issues. I appear today on behalf of the Smart Building Policy Project, although I should note
that I appear as an analyst and not as an advocate. So please don't
hold what I say against them. These are my positions as to how
I see the constitutional issues in this case and not necessarily the
position that their counsel, or the members of the Project would
necessarily take.
It seems to me that the issues posed by this hearing and by the
FCC's notice of proposed rulemaking are twofold. One, whether
there would be an unconstitutional -taking of property and, two,
whether the FCC has authority to effect such a nile. And I start
with the fIrst by noting that Chairman Canady and Mr. Rosenthal
are perfectly correct and cogent in their analysis of the Loretto decision, and with that I have absolutely no quibble with the analysis
set forth there, nor with the court's decision in Loretto. I think it
is correct.
By the same token, I believe that the 11th Circuit's decision on
the takings issues in 47 USC section 224, the mandatory access
provisions with respect to the utilities, is also correct. That works
as a taking because those statutory provisions require the utilities
to open up their lines, open up their utilities, their rights of way
and their premises which they own or control to uninvited telccommunications providers.
What the FCC proposes, as I understand in "this case, is not such
a "mandatory access requirement." It is not forcing building owners
to open up their doors to uninvited telecommunications providers.
Rather, it is simply a requirement that should building owners
open up- their door to any telecommunications provider, then they
would have to open up their door to other telecommunications providers on nondiscriminatory terms.
So in that sense, I think that this case poses a potential conflict,
if you will, that requires careful line drawing between two lines of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Loretto line of cases, which I
think is jurisprudentially valid and very sensible, and also another
line of cases, cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel, which says that it
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is not a taking where you open up your premises for public accommodation to require nondiscrimination on bases of race, religion
and gender and the like, as announced by Congress in the Civil
,
Rights Act of 1964.
Analogously, if you open up a mall to public access, as Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robbins, the court says you cannot discriminate
against certain speech because you happen to disagree with that
speech. If you open it up, you have to open it up equally, and that
is simply a condition of the access provisions.
In that sense I think that the case of Yee v. Escondido is quite
apt, and that case specifically addressed the the discussion in footnote 17 of Loretto, which Mr. Rosenthal referred to regarding the
conditioning of access on a nonpayment of rental for the cable television line that case. In Yee v. Escondido, the court made very clear
that the Loretto does not seek to address cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel. Indeed, it cited it, or cases like the cases that uphold
rent control laws or fire codes, which, in some sense, require a
physical intrusion. By requiring a fire detector to be on a property,
that is a physical occupation of space, yet those cases are looked
under a regulatory taking point of view as the court did in Yee v.
Escondido rather than on a physical taking line of case as in
Loretto. And the court in Yee specifically distinguished those cases.
Indeed, Yee itself concerned a statutory and ordinance scheme
whereby the landowner in that case, an owner of mobile home
parks, did not have an opportunity to object to the tenants in the
mobile home park, and so it specifically addresses the points that
are relevant to this case.
That said, I think it is a very hard constitutional question, and
the task of line drawing rests with the Supreme Court. So I do not
venture to propose a conclusion here. What I do note, however, is
that even if there is a physical taking or a taking of any type, there
is adequate provisjon in the FCC's contemplation for just compensation. I suspect that that would be where most of your questions would be: how the FCC would be able to effect such a just
compensation under a nondiscriminatory regime. I am sure that all
three of us would be happy to answer questions in that regard, and
I am sure the economists in the next panel would be happy to provide the details in that regard.
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Dinh.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dinh follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
Thank you very much for this opportunity to comment on the constitutional issues
raised by the pending FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on nondiscriminatory
telecommunications access to multi-tenant environments. I note that there are several bills pending in Congress that seek to ensure the same result as the proposals
under consideration by the FCC.
I am an Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center
where I specialize in constitutional law, among other things. Prior to joining the faculty, I was a law clerk to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the U.S. Supreme Court,
and to Judge Laurence Silberman on the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit. I
am currently writing JUDICIAL AUTHORITY ANn SEPARATION OF POWERS; A REFERENCE GUIDE To THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, to by published by Greenwood Press.
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Although I appear on behalf of the Smart Building Policy Project,l I am here as
an analyst and not an advocate. My analysis, therefore, is not necessarily the position of the Project or any of its members; rather, it is simply how I see the constitutional issues in this matter.
The takings issue posed by this hearing's inquiry concerning the FCC's Notice
consists of two Prin~k;~ questions: (1) whether a nondiscriminatory access requirement constitutes a
. g of private property for public use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) even if such a requirement IS constitutionally sound, whether the FCC has authority to promulgate the proposed
rules. I will address each question in turn. For the reasons detailed below, I conclude that the nondiscriminatory access proposals are constitUtionally sound and
that the FCC has the statutory authority to promulgate them.
I. The ConstitutWTUllity of a NondiscrimiTUltory Access Requirement
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that private property shall
not "be taken forrublic use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The
proper analysis 0 the proposed FCC action, accordingly, has two component steps:
(A) whether a nondiscnminatory access requirement constitutes a taking of private
property; and (B) if it is a taking of property, whether the property owners would
not receive just compensation. Only if both inquiries yield affirmative answers
would there be a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
A. Taking.
The Supreme Court has established two tests to determine whether a government
action constitutes a taking. A permanent physical occupation of private property is
a taking per se, see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 426 (1982); the only question is whether there would be adequate compensation. By contrast, other government regulations not involving a permanent physical
occupation, such as conditions on the use of private property, are takings only if
they fail the multifactor balancing test applicable to regulatory takings. See, e.g.,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
Whether a nondiscriminatory access requirement constitutes a permanent physical occupation that is a per se taking under Loretto is a close question, one that
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed. Nor has my research revealed any
holding or discussion in lower court opinions directly on point.
Unlike the proposed nondiscriminatory access requirement, if the FCC were to require building owners to open up their property for any and all telecommunications
companies to install their equipment, such a requirement would constitute a per se
taking. That much is evident from the facts of Loretto itself, and it matters not that
the intrusion is minimal-that the ceded area is no "bigger than a breadbox."
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16. In that regard, I think the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit correctly held in Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324,
1328 (l1th Cir. 1999), that the mandatory access provision of 47 U.S.C. § 224 is a
per se taking. (The court further held that the taking is constitutional because there
are adequate procedures for just compensation, a bubject to which I return below
in Part B.)
A nondiscriminatory access requirement of the typ(. proposed by the FCC, however, is substalltively different, Instead of mandating that a property owner open
his property to outsiders, a nondiscrimination provision simply requires that, should
the owner open his property to any outsider, he must also entertain others. The proposal, therefore, is analogous to the nondiscrimination requirement of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the Supreme Court held not to constitute a taking of property in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261
(1964). Heart of Atlanta Motel, of course, is not directly apposite because Title VII
requires general access to places of public accommodation only, and the FCC J?roposal would provide limited access to property retained for private use. This distmction, however, turns on the public p\ll'POse of the government action. Witb respect
to whether the action constitutes a taking, however, it seems to me that the two
nondiscriminatory access requirements are quite analogous.
So viewed, nondiscrimination is but a governmental condition on a property owner's decision to provide some carriers access to his property. Even where such a condition would work a permanent physical intrusion, the condition would constitute
1 The members of the growing Smart Building Policy Project currently include the American
Electronics Association, the Association for Local Telecommunications Services, AT&T Corp., the
Competition Policy Institute, the Information Technology Association of America, the Inter·
national Communications Association, MCI WorldCom, NEXTLINK Communications, TeJigent,
Inc., Winstar Communications, Inc., and the Wireless Communications Association.
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a taking only if there is not a sufficient nexus to the government's authority to regulate the underlr·ng action. Thus, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commissum, 483
U.S. 825 (1987 , the Commission conditioned the grant of a bUilding pennit upon
provision of a permanent easement to provide access to public beaches. The Court
held that a permanent access easement is a permanent physical occu~ation under
Lorett, see id. at 831-32; however, that holding did not end the analysIs. The easement requirement constituted a taking only because, as a condition, it did not bear
a sufficient nexus to the government's reason for regulating the construction of the
residential home. See id. at 836-37. The Court later explained that a sufficient
nexus exists if there is a "rough proportionality' between the "nature and extent"
of the condition and the "impact" of the underlYIng activity. Dolan v. City of Tigard
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Following these guidelines, numerous courts have upheld
permanent access easements as reasonable conditions. See, e.g., Curtis v. Town of
South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 65~0 (Me. 1998) (upholding a fire safety re~a
tion that conditioned approval of a subdivision plan upon the developer bUilding a
fire pond and granting the town an easement to maintain and use the pond);
Grogan v. Zoning Board of Town of East Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (App. Div.
1995) (upholding zoning board's decision to condition grant of pennit to build additi~n ~nto house UJ)On owner's granting scenic and conservation easement), appeal
dISmISSed, 670 N.E.2d 228 (N.Y. 1996); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738,
745-46 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (upholding planning commission's decision to condition approval of short plat appli~ations upon dedication of rights of way for road improvement). Just 80 WIth the FCC's proposed nondiscriminatory access requirement.
Such a nondiscrimination condition bears a sufficient nexus to the FCC's authority
to rettnlate property owners' provision of access to telecommunication carriers; the
nondiscrimination condition is proportional to the impact of the landowners' actions,
that is perpetuatjng local telecom monopolies through discriminatory access.
Another. analogous line of cases is the rule in antitrust law that a dominant market participant must provide competitors access to essential facilities it owns. See,
e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1983). Despite calls from commentators,2 my research has uncovered no case holding that such a requirement
constitutes I! per se taking under Loretto. In Consolidated Gas Co. of Florida v. City
Gas Co. of Florida, 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), vacated as moot,
499 U,S. 915 (1991), the Eleventh Circuit, 8ittin~ en banc, affirmed a district court
decision that invoked the essential facilities rationale and ordered the respondent
to sell wholesale gas to the petitioner at reasonable prices-over the objections of
two dissenting judges that such relief raised Fifth Amendment concerns, see id. at
1312-20, and specifically that it would work a per se taking under Loretto. See id.
at 1315 n.52.
In sum, whether a nondiscriminatory access requirement is a per se taking is an
open question. Any unqualified answer in the affirmative is in error because it gives
conclusive weight to Loretto and ignores the competing principles set forth in cases
like Heart of Atlanta Motel and Nollan-. 1 do not venture a conclusion here because
the question requires resolvin~ the conflict between two competing lines of cases,
both of which are jurisprudentially sensible and legally valid'a task of line drawing
that ultimately rests with the Supreme Court. In ~y event, such a speculation is
not nece88ary to my ultimate conclusion that the FCC proposals are constitutionally
sound.
If a nondiscrimination access requirement does not work a per se taking, the proposed FCC action is likely to be upheld 1\8 a permissible regulation of the uae of
private property under the "ad hoc, factual inquiries" into the factors summarized
m Penn Central: the character of the government action, the economic impact of
that action, and its interference, if any, with investment·backed expectations. See
438 U.S. at 124. First, the proposed regulations are designed to further the public
interest, as defined by Congress, "to foster competition in local telecommunication
markets." Notice of Proposeii Rulemaking, ,1(released July 7, 1999); see 47 U.S.C.
§ 251. The Court "has often upheld substantial regulation of an owners' use of his
own property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest." Loretto, 458
U.S. at 426. Second, the economic impact of the proposed reguIatir.ns is minimal,
at most. Property owners will be directly compensated for the use of property they
own and control and indirectly compensated, through rents, for the use of property
they own but is controlled by a communications carrier. Third, any expectations
~See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. &: J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilitiu. 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187,
122740 (1999) (argumg that if a court were to treat Microsoft's operating system software 88
an essential facility and were to require Microsoft to inelude Netscape's internet browser in that
operating system, the government would have taken Microsoft's property, under the per lie rule
in Loretto, and would be required to pay just compeMBtlon).

--- -
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backed by the owners' investments are in the use of their property as real estate.
These expectations are minimal, if not nil, with respect to ducts ana roof space dedicated to utility equipment. Any fortuitous opportunity they now have to participate
in the telecommunications business (either as competitors or as lessors of facilities)
results from the deregulatory program that the FCC has pursued following a congressional directive. In any event, any investment-backed expectations the owntJrs
may have in telecommunications are limited because the owners are operating in
a field (telecommunications andlor transacting with communications carriers) that
is heavily regulated by the federal government. Such regulations are constantly in
flux, rendering unreasonable any assumption or expectation that a nondiscriminatory access requirement or other regulation on the use of their property would
not be imposed in the future.
B. Compensation.
Even if, arguendo, the proposed FCC regulations constitute a taking, the analysis
does not end. "The Fifth AD'lendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it
llroscribes taking without just colllpensation." Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). "If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process
yields just compensation, then the property owner has no claims against the government for a taking." [d. at 195. According to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
FCC contemplates two primary avenues for effecting nondiscriminatory access to
multi-tenant environments for communications carriers. First, the FCC mar require
incumbent local exchange carriers to provide competitors with access, at Just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, to the conduits and rights of way that they
control (through leaseholds or other access arrangements) in the buildin~s. See Notice of ProJ?C?sed Rulemaking, "36 48. Second, the FCC may require building owners to proVlde competitive 10000exchange carriers equal access, at nondiacriminatory
rates, to their property for the purpose of installing transmission equ!p'ment tQ service tenants. See id. '60. Under either avenue, the FCC may ensure that a reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation emt[s] at the time
of the taking." WiiUiamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
First, should the FCC require incumbent carriers to provide access to the conduits
lind rights of way that they control, 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) permits the carriers to assess
charges for such access. The statute sets forth a clear formula for the carrier to recover costs of providing access, through an allocation of the costs of providing both
usable and unusable space in the conduits and rights of way. The provision further
requires the FCC to promulKate regulations to govern the access charges should
"the parties fail to resolve a dispute over such charges." Id. § 224(eXl). "Such regulations shall ensure that a utility charges just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
rates for pole attachments." Id.
This statutory procedure guarantees the incumbent carrier ample opportunities to
obtain just compensation for providing access. In the first instance, it may levy compensatory charges according to the prescribed cost allocation formula. Should there
be a dispute as to such charges, it may negotiate at arms length with the competitive carrier to set appropriate rates. Finally, should the dispute not be resolved, the
FCC, after appropnate complaints an~roceedings, may determine rates that are
"just, reasonable, and nondiscriminato
pursuant to duly promulgated regulations.
On its face, therefore, the statute satie es the just compensation requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. I suppose that there is a possibility that a particular agency determination of a "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rate would not provide,
in the final analysis, "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment. Such risk,
however, inheres in every governmental action, and the remote _possibility does not
render the FCC proposal facially unconstitutional. See Gulf Power, 187 F.3d at
133738. In any event, the FCC's rate determination, like other agency actions, is
subject to judicial review; the incumbent carrier, therefore, is afforded full protection
against the risk of such administrative error. See id. at 1338.
Second, with respect to access to areas owned and controlled solely by property
owners, the FCC proposes that the owners be paid "nondiscriminatory" rates for
such access. The Commission is currently seeking comments on how such rates
should be determined, so the precise parameters of such compensation are not fixed.
I note, however, that the Commission proposes that property owners be permitted
"to obtain from a new entrant the same compensation it has voluntarily agreed to
accept from an incumbent LEC." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ,60. Such reliance
on the arms-Ien~h bargain struck with incumbent carriers seems to me a reaso,p.able approximation of the fair market value of access and thus would provide just
comp'!;nsation for any taking of property. To the extent that changed circumstances
or different market conditions may render such original compensation an unreliable
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indicator of fair value, the Commission has also sought commenu on how to tailor
any nondiscriminatory access requirement to ensure consumer choice uwithout in.
fringing on the rights of property owners." rd. , 55. Thus, at this point, there is little
reason to suspect that the procedures for setting nondiscriminatory access charges
would not ensure a fair, certain and adequate process for property owners to obtain
just compensation for any taking of their property.
II. The Commission's Authority to Promulgate the Proposed Rules
. The nondiscriminatory access proposals by the FCC also raise certain separation
of powers considerations concerning the Commission's authority to promulgate the
proposed regulations. For reasons outlined below, I conclude that the Commission
would likely be found to have such authority.
As an initial matter, there is little question that, shorn of the Fifth Amendment
implications of the proposed requirements, the Commission has authority to regu.
late access to multi-tenant enVIrOnments for the provision of telecommunications
services. With respect to facilities controlled by incumbent carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 224
explicitly authorizes th, Commission to require that a utility provide access to any
"duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned. or controlled
it," id. §224(f')(I), and the statute defines utility to include communications earners, See id. § 24(aXl). With reo
spect to property owned and controlled by the building owners, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152
grant the Commission authority to regulate the transmission of interstate wire or
radio communication. The definition ofwire communication includes "all instrumen'
talities, facilities, apparatus, and services. . . incidental to such transmission" and
thus contemplates property used for the p~se of providing interstate communica·
tion services. Id. § 153(52). And 47 U.S.C. tf 151, 152 further grant the Commis· _
sion authority to regulate persons engaged in interstate wire communication, 811
that term is defined. above. Building owne~l .accordingly, are persons engaged. in
interstate wire communication by virtue of Uleir control or denial of access to the
facilities incidental to the transmission of such communication. Finally, the Commission has authority under 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) to "make such rules and regulations,
. . . not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be nece8SllJ-Y in the execution of iu
functions" and under 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) to "[m)a1te such rules and regulations and
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Although the authority under the
provisions is frequently termed "anclllary jurisdiction" in the telecommunications
parlance, it is more aptly analogized to a feneral necessary and proper authority
to effectuate the purposes and provisions 0 the statute. See PETER HUBER, ET AL.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw § 3.3.1, at 221 (2d ed. 1999).
The analysis into agency authority, however, is further complicated by the presence of Fifth Amendment considerations as outlined above. In Bell Atlantic Tele·
phone Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit reviewed orders
of the Commission that required. carriers to set aside a portion of their central offices for use by their competitors-known as the physical co-location orders. The j)etitioners challenged the Commission's authority to promulgate the regulations. The
court recognized that it would normally defer to the Commission's statutory interpretation under the principles announced in Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837 (1984), but held that it would not do so in this case because the Commission's
interpretation raised substantial constitutional questions regarding executive encroachment on Congress' exclusive powers to appropriate funds. See Bell Atlantic,
24 F.3d at 1445. Specifically, the court found that the FCCs orders amounted to a
forced access requirement, and thus in all cases "will necessarily constitute a tak·
ing" under Loretto. See id. at 1445-46 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985». To avoid this perceived constitutional
difficulty, the court held that the Commission's authority to order physical co-Iocation must either be found in express statutory language or must be a necessary implication from that language, such that "the grant [of authority) itself would be de·
feated unless [takings] power were implied." Id. at 1446 (quoting Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 120 F. 362, 373 (C.C.W.D.Pa. 1903), afl'd, 195 U.S. 540
(1904» (alterations in original). Finding this "strict test of statutory authority made
necessary by the constitutional implications of the Commission's action" not satisfied, the court held that the Commission lacked authority to issue the physical colocation orders. Id. at 1447.
Upon closer analysis, however, the holding of Bell Atlantic does not apply to the
nondiscriminatory access requirements proposed. by the FCC. First, the regulation
of areas controlled by a communications carrier follow from the express authorization to order a phYSical taking found in 47 U.S.C. § 224. As to that portion of the
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proposed rule, therefore, the "strict test" of Bell Atlantic is satisfied. 3 Second, the
requirement of nondiscriminatory access to areas owned and controlled by landlords,
unlike the forced access orders at issue in Bell Atlantic, will not unecessarily constitute a taking." As I concluded above, whether the requirement will be judged
under the Loretto standard or the competing standards applied in Heart of Atlanta
Motel or Nollan is a close question. In Loretto the Court rejected the suggestion that
the installation of cable equipment was not a per se taking because the property
owner retained the right to cease renting his property to tenants and thereby to
avoid the requirement. It explained that ua landlord's ability to rent his property
may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical
occupation." Loretto; 458 U.S. at 439 n.17. However, the COmmission is contemplating regulations that would ensure property owners receive just compensation for
an)' physical occupation of their property. And the Commission has &uthority to reqwre new entrants into a building to pay just compensation to property owners
under 47 U.S.C. §§ 154m, 303(r), as such regulations are "reasonablr. ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilitie~," United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). In particular, the statute reguires the Commission to foster competition in local telecommunications markets. On Bell Atlantic's reasoning, therefore, a reviewing court should grant Chevron
deference to the Commission's interpretation of its authority under the statute.
As Professors Baumol and Merrill explained in assessing whether ~rovisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 effect an unconstitutional taking: [Als long as
the Act includes mechanisms which can provide just compensation for any taking
claims found to have merit, these claims, too, should provide no basis to halt the
implementation of the Act in the manner deemed most appropriate by regulators
to achieve its purpose." William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory
Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of
1996,'72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037, 1056 (1997).
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In the final analysis, I conclude that the nondiscriminatory access proposals are
constitutionally BOund and that the FCC has the statutory authority to promulgate
them. Thank you.

Mr. CANADY. Professor Eagle.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN J. EAGLE, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to the subcommittee today. My name is Steven
Eagle. I am a professor of law at George Mason University, and I
am here today in my capacity as a scholar whose interest is in the
intersection of property and constitutional law.
I think that as Mr. Conyers had mentioned earlier, Congress certainly is well advised to try to facilitate ways to have universal access to all kinds of information and an expansion of our teleeommunications system to do that. However, we have to do that,
of course, within- the context of fifth amendment protections for
property rights. After all, the purpose of the fifth amendment is not
to rule out government activities because they are impermissible
but, to the contrary, to reconcile permissible and even laudable government activities with the requirements of the Constitution that
the property rights of individuals be respected.
Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, you quoted parts of
Justice Marshall's Loretto opinion that I otherwise would have
3Because 47 U.S.C. §224{fXl) requires a carrier to provide access to ducts and conduits
"owned or controlled" by it, Congress clearly contemplated that the FCC would regulate property
that is merely controlled by a carrier and therefore owned by a third party. Thus, even if the
proposed regulations based upon § 224 necessarily effect a taking without just compensation to
property owners in every case, CO~B8 in §224 has expressly granted the FCC the power to
effect such takings and hss concomitantly authorized the expenditures needed to satisfy those
owners' claims for just compensation.
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quoted here. Certain!y the Loretto case has to be the beginning of
our inquiry. The FCC and other groups that wish to impose mandatory access have the obligation, I think, to distinguish why the
Loretto case should not be govern in this situation.
Loretto, it is true, does not affect the economic regulation of owners of different aspects of a parcel, such as landlord and tenant,
within the context of an ongomg relationship. That was recognized
in the telecommunications field by the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Florida Power in 1987, where the Court made it clear that the FCC
did have the right to regulate a carrier's relationship with a cable
company it had voluntarily allowed access to its lines. However, I
think it is important to note that Courts of appeals have drawn the
line at that. In subsequent cases where there has been a mandated
access to utility company lines, the courts have said that this is an
impermissible taking, or would be an impermissible taking, unless
there were just compensation.
The two leading cases are the Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit
decision in Bell Atlantic v. FCC, which is the co-location case of
1994, and, most on point, Gulf Power Company v. United States,
1999. There, the 11th Circuit adjudicated the extension of the Pole
Attachments Act to provide for mandatory access to equipment.
The Eleventh Circuit said that it was the voluntary nature of the
access in Florida Power was determinative and if there was not a
voluntary relationshi,e, the takings clause is violated.
I think that cases hke Heart or Atlanta and Yee, with respect, are
not quite on point. For instance, in the Heart of Atlanta case, the
government was vindicating a Civil Rights statute, and more important for our immediate purpose, it was vindicating a person's
right to have a license in a hotel room for a one night period or
a few nights. This is not the kind of permanent physical occupation
that Loretto contemplated. Likewise, Yee v. City of Escondido, a
case reviewed by the Supreme Court only to resolve a conflict between State and Ninth Circuit jurisprudence having to do with mobile homes, is a rather anomalous case. The Court vindicated the
right of a mobile homeowner to sell his unit to another and vindicated rent control principles generally. Yee ought not to be extended beyond that.
I want to emphasize two elements in Professor Dinh's written
testimony. The first has to do with exclusivity. He asserts that the
FCC could reasonably simply take the charges of an existing carrier as a baseline to determine reasonable charges for a new_ carrier. Well, you can't unscramble the omelet that easily. Presumably, an exclusive relationship allows all kinds of economic factors
at work that f.iecemeal relationships don't. Pricing is a subject for
the next pane, but I suggest that would be extremely difficult.
Second, Professor Dinh says there is little reason to suspect that
procedures used by the FCC for just compensation would not be
fair. With respect, I have testified before this subcommittee earlier,
and many others have as well regarding the problem of providing
adequate State procedures to deal with State condemnations or
State re£Ulatory takings prior to litigation in the Federal courts. I
submit tnat a procedure where the FCC engages in determinations
before Federal courts can hear a case will be, in effect, the creation
of another Williamson County ripeness doctrine within the Federal

